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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
VIRGIL S. REDMOND,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
10610

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Virgil S. Redmond, appeals from
a conviction on jury trial for the crime of uttering a
fictitious check in the Third Judicial District for Salt
Lake County.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was charged with uttering a fictitious check. Prior to trial a motion for the production of certain checks in the possession of the police
was made by appellant. The trial court denied the
motion for production. The jury returned a verdict
of guilty to the charge of uttering a fictitious check,
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and the appellant was sentenced to a term in the
Utah State Prison.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The respondent submits the conviction should
be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent submits the following statement of
facts.
The appellant was charged with the crime of is·
suing a fictitious check in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-26-7 (1953). The amended information
stated that appellant "with intent to defraud ... did
utter a fictitious check purporting to be an instrument in writing for the payment of money of CARL.
J. COON, and there was then and there no such person as CARL I. COON, in existence," the appellant
then and there knowing the said instrument to be
fictitious (R. l ).
Respondent accepts as factual the statement of
facts presented by appellant as to the proceedings
prior to trial. Appellant had demanded access to
checks then allegedly in the hands of the County
Attorney. This court affirmed the decision of the District Court in denying such access in Redmond v.
City Court, 17 Utah 2d 95, 404 P.2d 964 (1965).
Appellant again demanded access to these
checks in a request for a bill of particulars in the
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Third District Court (R. 2). The court ruled that evidence concerning checks other than the one
charged in the information was not material to the
issue in the case (R. 617). The court also denied appellant's motion for such access at the commencement of trial (R. 625), in his motion for a continuance
(R. 358), and his motion for a new trial (R. 358). Appellant admitted ample opportunity was available
to see the specific check in question (R. 624) and
that he had in fact had such a copy in his possession.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT ACCESS TO CHECKS IN THE POSSESSION
OF THE PROSECUTION SINCE:
A. DUE PROCESS DOES NOT COMPEL PRODUCTION OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED.
B. CRIMINAL DISCOVERY PROCEDURES DO

NOT REQUIRE SUCH PRODUCTION.

The appellant's contention that the denial of access to the requested checks is a violation of due
process of law is without merit. The information supplied by the prosecution amply apprises the appellant of the charge against him. There is no dispute as
to the check in question; the prosecution was based
only on this single check. In Leland v. Oreqon, 343
U.S. 790 (1952), the United States Supreme Court
passed on the refusal of a state trial court to require
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the district attorney to make available to defendant
his confession to the crime charged. Also, in Cicenia
v. LaGay. 357 U.S. 504 (1958), the same issue was considered by the United States Supreme Court and the
contention was again rejected. The Court observed,
357 U.S. at 510:
... He argues that he was deprived of due process
because New Jersey required him to plead to the indictment for murder without the opportunity to inspect his confession.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not reach so far.
As stated by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in
the earlier proceedings in this case, 6 N.J. 296, 299301, 78 A.2d 568 at 570, 571, the rule in that State
is that the trial judge has discretion whether or not
to allow inspection before trial. This is consistent
with the practice in many other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., State v. Haas, 188 Md. 63, 51 A.2d 647; People
v. Skoyec, 183 Wisc. 764, 50 NYS 2d 438; State v.
Clark, 21 Wash.2d 774, 153 P.2d 297. In Leland v.
Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 801, 802, 96 L. ed. 1302, 1311,
72 St. Ct. 1002, this Court held that in the absence
of a showing of prejudice to the defendant it was not
a violation of due process for a state to deny counsel
an opportunity before trial to inspect his client's
confession. It is true that in Leland the confession
was made available to the defense at the trial several
days before its case was rested, whereas here the
petitioner pleaded non vult without an opportunity
to see the confession. We think that the principle of
that case is nonetheless applicable. As was said in
Leland (343 U.S. 801), although it may be the
'better practice' for the prosecution to comply with
a request for inspection, we cannot say that the dis-
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cretionary refusal of the trial judge to permit inspection in this case offended the Fourteenth Amendment.

In People v. Rosario, 9 N.Y. 2d 286, 173 N.E.2d
881 (1961), the appellant contended that he was denied due process of law and, in addition, that it was
error for the trial judge to refuse to turn over to defense counsel statements given before trial by three
prosecution witnesses. The New York Court of Ar;peals rejected the argument and affirmed the conviction. See also People ex rel. Lemon v. Supreme
Court. 245 N.Y. 24, 156 N.E. 84 (1927), where Justica
Cardozo ruled that there was no requirement for
general discovery by the defendant in a criminal
case. Some courts have felt that this constitutes the
work product of the prosecuting attorney. State v.
Bunk. 63 A.2d 842, 845 (N.J. 1949).
One of the most instructive opm1ons on the
question of whether or not liberal discovery in criminal cases should be allowed was rendered in State
v. Tune. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), by Chief
Justice Vanderbilt, long a supporter of law reform.
He stated, 98 A.2d at 884:
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught
the courts that often discovery will lead not to honest
fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and the
suppression of evidence. Thus the criminal who is
aware of the whole case against him will of ten procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false
defense ... Another result of full discovery would be
that the criminal defendant who is informed of the
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names of all the State's witnesses may take steps to
bribe or to frighten them into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves so that they are
unavailable to testify. Moreover, many witnesses, if
they know that the defendant will have knowledge
of their names prior to trial, will be reluctant to come
forward with information during the investigation of
the crime . . .. All these dangers are more inherent
in criminal proceedings where the defendant has
much more at stake, often his own life, than in civil
proceedings. The presence of perjury in criminal proceedings today is extensive despite the efforts of the
courts to eradicate it and it constitutes a very seriou5
threat to the administration of criminal justice and
thus to the welfare of the country as a whole .... To
permit unqualified disclosure of all statements and
information in the hands of the State would go far beyond what is required in civil cases; it would defeat the
very ends of justice.
In considering the problem it must be remembered
that in view of the defendant's constitutional and
statutory protections against self-incrimination, the
State has no right whatsoever to demand an inspection of any of his documents or to take his deposition,
or to submit interrogatories to him.
Except for its right to demand particulars from the
defendant as to any alibi on which he intends to rely,
Rule 2:5-7, the State is completely at the mercy of
the defendant who can produce surprise evidence at
the trial can take the stand or not as he wishes, and
'
.
generally can introduce any sort of unforseeable evidence he desires in his own defense. To allow him to
discover the prosecutor's whole case against him
would be to make the prosecutor's task almost insurmountable.
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Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Garsson, 291 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), observed, 291 Fed.
at 649:
Under our criminal procedure the accused has every
advantage. While the prosecution is held rigidly to the
charge, he need not disclose the barest outline of his
defense. He is immune from question or comment on
his silence; he cannot be convicted when there is the
least fair doubt in the minds of any one of the twelve.
Why in addition he should in advance have the whole
evidence against him to pick over at his leisure, and
make his defense, fairly or foully, I have never been
able to see .... Our dangers do not lie in too little
tenderness to the accused.Our procedure has always
been haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment
that obstructs, delays and defeats the prosecution of
crime.

Consequently, it is manifestly apparent that
there is no merit to appellant's contention that due
process of law somehow requires this information.
Such information was unrelated to the specific
charge before the Court. The respondent submits
that the above discussion is responsive to appellants
points one through four.
POINT II
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES ARE ENTRUSTED TO
THE SOUND DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE EXERCISE OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A DENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION.
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As stated in appellant's brief, this court has denounced as "dangerous" a procedure whereby the
prosecution would "screen" evidence to be made
available to the defendant and has held that this
function is a judicial function to be performed by the
court. State v. Faux, 9 Utah 2d 350, 345 P.2d 186 (1959).
The respondent does not question this statement. It
is incumbent on the court system to protect the
rights of the accused in all cases. The trial court's
function is to insure that the defendant is granted
all the rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed
by the United States Constitution and the respective
state constitutions. Who else is better qualified to
do so? The respective functions of the prosecutor
and the court was set out by the Washington Supreme Court in State v. Clark, 21 Wash. 2d 77 4, 778,
153 P.2d 297, 299 (1944):
A prosecuting attorney is under no obligation to
submit any evidence he has in his possession to counsel for a person charged with crime .... The state is
not required to submit its evidence to counsel for the
accused. The accused is not, as a matter of right, entitled to have for inspection before trial evidence
which is in the possession of the prosecution. Such
matter is peculiarly within the trial court's discretion, with which we will interfere only when there has
been a manifest abuse of discretion. [Emphasis added.]

The appellant was heard several times in his attempts to gain access to the information held by the
prosecution (R. 358, 625). Appellant alleges that Utah
Code Ann. § 77-21-9 (1953) permits him an additional
discovery device. However, in State v. Lack, 118 Utah
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128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950), this court observed that a
bill of particulars was not available as a discovery
device, stating, 118 Utah at 134:
Sec. (77-21-9, U.C.A. 1953) was designed to enable
a defendant to have stated the particulars of the
charge which he must meet, where the short form of
indictment or information is used. It was not intended
as a device to compel the prosecution to give an accused person a preview of the evidence on which the
state relies to sustain the charge.

In State v. Jamison, 103 Utah 129, 134 P.2d 173
(1943), this court stated, 103 Utah at 132:
He demanded a further bill of particulars showing
the exact time, the exact place, whether in or out of
a car, and what other person, if any, was present. The
court did not err in refusing this request. The purpose
of a bill of particulars is to inform the defendant of
the particulars of the offense sufficiently to enable
him to prepare his defense .... The bill of particulars furnished informed him of the nature of the offense, the time and place of its commission, and was
therefore sufficient. The bill of particulars need not
plead matters of evidence.

The trial court found the complaint with the additional information supplied by the prosecution to
be sufficient to apprise the appellant of the nature
of the accusation. It is uniformly settled that a bill of
particulars may not be used as a means of gaininq
information concerning the prosecution's evidence.
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice § 64 (4th ed.); Moreland, Modem Criminal Procedure 213-14 (1958). This
rule is stated in Annot. 5 A.L.R.2d 444 at 457 (1949):
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The particulars sought by an accused often are
such that the furnishing of them would amount to a
disclosure of the prosecution's evidence. In some instances the demand is obviously an exploratory maneuver. Except in those cases in which such information is essential to the accused in order to enable
him to prepare for his defense, the courts are not inclined to favor the granting of such particulars.
POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING THE
STATE TO PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE CHECK
PURPORTEDLY UTTERED BY APPELLANT.

The check on which the information was based
purports to be one for the payment of money of Prudential Federal Adjusters, with the authorized signature being "C. Coon" (R. 20). This check has been referred to as plaintiff's Exhibit 6 in the record (hereinafter referred to as "P. 6"). A witness for the State
identified P. 6 as the one appellant cashed at Makoff's (R. 303, 342). There is no issue that P. 6 was the
check on which appellant was given a preliminary
hearing (R. 624), that P. 6 was the check mentioned
in the information (R. 624), and that P. 6 was the
check which appellant was convicted of uttering
(R. 115).
The information was amended several times: to
add middle initial "S." to appellant's name (R. 596);
to substitute the name of "Carl J. Coon" for that of
"C. J. McCall" (R. 605); to change the date of the alleged uttering from the "8th" to the "11th" day cf
April (R. 606). In none of these instances did appel-
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lant object to the amending of the information. In
only one instance did the appellant object to an
amendment and that objection was denied. The information showed the alleged event to have occurred in "1965"; the prosecution considered this a
typographical error and requested it be changed to
read "1964" (R. 624). At that time appellant admits
that he had seen a copy of the check in question,
since he attached a thermofax copy of it to one of
his motions (R. 624).
The check mentioned in the information bore the
name "Cal J. Coon" as the purported maker. Assuming arguendo that the State should have amended
the information to read "Cal J. Coon," the fact that
this was not done has not been a denial of appellant's rights under the law. At best, this discrepancy
would be an immaterial variance and would not constitute reversible error. A mere variance in the letters with which the name of the victim of an offense
is spelled is not fatal. People v. Gormach, 302 Ill. 332,
134 N.E. 756 (1922).
In State v. Gorham, 93 Utah 274, 72 P.2d 656
(1937) this court considered the rule of idem sonans
as applied to forgery and uttering cases. It stated,
93 Utah at 288:
We concede it to be well established in criminal prosecutions for forgery that the named charged to be
forged must be proved as alleged in the indictment or
information . . . . It is not essential, however, that
the names be spelled in the same way, or that they
be correctly spelled. If substantially the same sound
is preserved, a variant of orthography will make
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no difference. The test always is, are the names as
spelled idem sonans-have the same sound?

POINT IV
IT WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL ERROR TO ALLOW
THE STATE TO CALL WITNESSES WHOSE NAMES
HAD NOT BEEN ENDORSED ON THE INFORMATION.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-52 (1953) requires the
prosecution to list on the face of the information the
names of witnesses on whose evidence the information is based. This is done to allow the defendant
an opportunity to learn on whose testimony the
state relied in bringing the charge against the defendant. In the instant case, the four names of the
witnesses who testified at the preliminary hearing
were so endorsed on the information, thus satisfying the requirements of the statute.
The statute continues, " ... the prosecuting attorney shall endorse on the information or indictment at such time as the court may rule or otherwise
prescribe the names of such other witnesses as he
purposes to call." (Emphasis added.) It is clear,
therefore, that the statute allows the trial court to determine when and if such names are to be endorsed.
Since this matter is discretionary with the court, the
failure to require the naming of prospective witnesses will stand unless the appellate court determines such actions to be an abuse of discretion. Th·:?
respondent submits that appellant was not so prejudiced as to have required either a new trial or a
continuance to prepare to meet this testimony.

13

The fact alleged by appellant that the district
attorney promised to give appellant the names of any
additional witnesses which might be called and then
failed to do so was not such as to require a continuance in the interest of justice. The failure to keep
this pledge may be a matter of faulty memory or
even poor judgment; however, no case will be reversed because of technical errors not amounting
to a deprivation of substantial justice. State v. Kinq,
66 Ariz. 42, 182 P.2d 915 (1947).
POINT V
IT IS NOT ERROR FOR A TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE EVIDENCE TO BE ADMISSIBLE FOR ONE
PURPOSE AFTER PREVIOUSLY RULING SUCH EVIDENCE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE.

The point at issue discussed here concerns the
right of trial courts to allow evidence on a given subject to reach the jury after having previously ruled
the evidence inadmissible when offered for another
purpose. This could well be characterized as nothing more than a change of the judicial mind or a redetermination of admissability which would be discretionary by the court and subject to reversal only
when there is a showing of manifest injustice which
results in substantial prejudice to the defendant.
Here, the evidence in question, the driver's license
and the check cashed at Albertson's was admitted for
one purpose, i.e., the establishment of the identity of
the appellant. It was not admitted to show propensity
to commit the crime as this court has condemned on
numerous occasions. As appellant points out in
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Point IX of his brief, the courts will allow evidence
of similar incidents when such tends to establish
the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial. People ·v. Harvey. 235 N. Y.
282, 139 N.E. 268 (1923). That such was the case is not
in dispute.
This court has faced this issue in a series of
criminal cases wherein the accused's history of similar criminal activity was being used by the prosecution in an attempt to show a propensity to commit
the specific crime charged. The court has uniformly
held this to be error. State v. Neal. 123 Utah 93, 254
P.2d 1053 (1953); State v. Cooper. 114 Utah 531, 201
P.2d 764 (1949); State v. Prettyman, 113 Utah 36, 191
P.2d 142 (1948); State v. Scott. 111 Utah 9, 175 P.2d
1016 (1947); State v. Nemier. 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d
327 (1944). However, the court also held, in State v.
Willard. 3 Utah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914 (1955), that evidence admissible for one purpose is not inadmissible because it fails to meet requirements for admissibility for another purpose, but the jury should be
instructed not to use it for the inadmissible purposes.
See also State v. Green. 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750
(1936).
POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING
OTHER CHECKS OF THE SAME SERIES, DRAWN ON
THE SAME BANK ACCOUNT, PAYABLE TO THE
SAME PAYEE, AND CASHED AT ABOUT THE SAME
TIME WITH THE SAME IDENTIFICATION TO BE INADMISSIBLE.
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At the time of the trial there was no issue before
the court as to the maker of the check in question.
The charge of "uttering" concerns itself with the
passing of the instrument knowing the same to be
fictitious. This is the only matter to be determined.
The respondent can see no possible materiality in
the other checks. The fact remains that only one
charge was before the court - the utttering of a
check for the sum of $186.35. It was of no import that
there were other checks in existence that were nearly identical to the check which formed the basis of
the information.
The rule that evidence should be confined to
matters in issue applies to criminal as well as civil
cases and evidence offered of matters having no
bearing on questions of fact in issue should be excluded. State v. Wheeler. 70 Idaho 455, 220 P.2d 687
(1950).
What could appellant have proved had other
checks been admitted? He claims to be able to show
that the check in question as well as the other checks
were all endorsed by the same individual. He asserts
a handwriting analysis would prove that appellant
did not in fact endorse any of the instruments. This
reasoning shows the basic error in appellant's case.
The appellant was charged and convicted of uttering and not of fraudulently endorsing the check.
Since uttering is complete when one attempts to pass
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a fictitious check, only evidence as to defendant's
identity and knowledge at the time of the alleged
passing is relevant. Appellant exercised the right of
cross-examination of the witnesses for the prosecution to discredit their testimony. The trier of fact
chose to believe the prosecution witnesses. The appellate court should not reverse a jury verdict unless there is a showing of error so damaging to the
defendant as to impair justice.
POINT VII
THE STATE'S EVIDENCE THAT IT HAD SEARCHED THIS AREA FOR THE ALLEGEDLY FICTITIOUS
PERSON WAS SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT NO
SUCH PERSON EXISTED.

The appellant made several objections as to the
foundation laid prior to the officer's testifying of his
inability to locate anyone in the vicinity of Salt Lake
County by the name of C. J. Coon, C. Coon, or Carl
Coon (R. 440), and to the jury instruction respecting
adequacy of search (R. 589). The officer stated that
he had checked the local phone book; called up the
utilities in the valley; called the Secretary of State's
office; and had checked the city and county directories for the current year and going back four years
(R. 440).
This specific issue was presented to this court
in State v. Willard, 3 Utah 2d 129, 279 P.2d 914 (1955),
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wherein the defendant contended an instruction almost identical to that given here (instruction 16) was
erroneous in limiting the territory within which the
person by that name must reside or be found. As
was stated by the court, 3 Utah 2d at 132:
Under a statute similar to ours, the California courts
.... held that in a prosecution for issuing a fictitious
check under such statute proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that no person in the world exists bearing the
name appended to the check is not required but that
it is only necessary to prove to a common certainty
that there is no such person as the one who purportedly made such check in the vicinity of the counties
connected with the act charged.

The court continued, 3 Utah at 133:
We further point out that this statute does not require that there be no person in existence who bears
the name appended to the check, but it does require
that there be no person in existence who purportedly,
or is claimed to have made such check. [Emphasis
added.]

The trial court required proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the nonexistence of the person who
purportedly made the check. The respondent submits that this ruling was correct and that it was in
fact proved to a common certainty.

CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the jury was convinced beyond
a reasonable doubt of the appellant's guilt. These
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findings of fact and conclusions of law are not erroneous.
This court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted,
PHIL L. HANSEN
Attorney General
GARY A. FRANK
Assistant Attorney General
State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Respondent

